EU Common Security and Defence Policy and Ukraine

The EU Global Security Strategy (EUGS) introduced a new overall approach to the foreign and security policy of the EU. These changes may be interpreted as a corrigendum to the European Security Strategy (ESS). Where the ESS had proved to be over-optimistic, the EUGS was more conscious of the limits imposed by the EU’s own capabilities and by the intractability of other countries. It charted a course between isolationism and interventionism, which the EUGS now calls ‘principled pragmatism.’ This represented a return to realpolitik. As the EUGS put it, ‘responsible engagement can bring about positive change’. The EUGS defined the interests that are vital to all Member States: the security of EU citizens and territory, prosperity, democracy, and a rules-based global order to contain power politics. Based on these interests, the EUGS identified five priorities: (1) the security of the EU itself; (2) the neighbourhood; (3) how to deal with war and crisis; (4) stable regional orders across t

Although the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union) entered into force in 1993, the first European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted only in 2003. However, the absence of a formal security strategy did not necessarily mean the failure of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. The EU Member States used an implicit 'European way' of doing things in field of security and defence and was characterized by cooperation with partner countries, an emphasis on conflict prevention, and a broad approach to aid trade and diplomacy. The ESS steered the development of EU partnerships and long-term policies, such as development policy. However, it proved insufficient when the EU faced a full-fledged security crisis. It was the EU's failure to address the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s and again in Kosovo in 1999 that drove the institutional development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The ES