EU Common Security and Defence Policy and Ukraine

The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) , presented in March 2024, aims to transform the European Union’s defence capabilities by 2035. With an increased focus on collaboration and innovation, EDIS seeks to address fragmentation in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and reduce the EU's dependence on non-EU suppliers, particularly from the U.S. At its core is the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) , a €1.5 billion initiative designed to boost collaboration across Member States. Through SEAP (Structure for European Armament Programme), EDIS encourages joint projects spanning the entire defence lifecycle – from research and development to procurement and maintenance. One of the most ambitious goals is for 50% of EU defence procurement to come from the EDTIB by 2030, improving Europe’s autonomy and resilience. Beyond addressing industrial gaps, EDIS emphasizes the importance of partnerships, particularly with Ukraine . As the war in Ukraine c

Introduction In an increasingly uncertain global landscape, the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) stands at a critical juncture. The rapidly changing geopolitical environment, marked by conflicts at Europe’s borders, hybrid threats, and shifting alliances, necessitates strategically reassessing the EU's security priorities. This publication aims to provide a forward-looking perspective on the evolution of the CSDP, outlining the policy’s future direction in response to these challenges. By exploring the potential developments in the CSDP, the article seeks to inform policymakers, security experts, and the public about the EU's strategic vision for enhancing its defence capabilities and ensuring stability in an increasingly complex world. This analysis is particularly timely in light of the recent security summits and defence cooperation agreements within the EU, reflecting a collective acknowledgement of the need for a cohesive and proactive approac

The European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a cornerstone of its efforts to bolster collective security and manage crises across its region and beyond. Over the years, the CSDP has undergone substantial development, reflecting the EU's growing ambition to play a more prominent role in global security. As of now, the CSDP exhibits both notable advantages and significant disadvantages. Advantages: Enhanced Cooperation Among Member States. The CSDP has significantly improved military and strategic cooperation among EU member states. By pooling resources and expertise, member countries are able to tackle security challenges more effectively than if acting alone. Initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) are prime examples of this cooperative spirit, aiming to enhance collective defence capabilities and foster joint military projects. Operational Capabilities and Missions. The EU has developed a broad

In a pivotal meeting conducted on 28 May 2024, European leaders discussed the evolving dynamics of military support to Ukraine amidst heightened geopolitical tensions. The discussion underscored a significant shift in EU defence strategy, marked by a newfound emphasis on readiness and robust military capabilities. Two years ago, terms like "Rapid Deployment Force" were cautiously avoided in favour of more neutral language like "Rapid Deployment Capacity." However, the urgency brought about by the conflict in Ukraine has prompted a re-evaluation. Now, there is a consensus on the need for a decisive "Rapid Deployment Force" to bolster EU defence preparedness against current and future threats. The meeting, attended by Ukraine’s Defence Minister Rustem Umerov via videoconference and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in person, focused on enhancing military assistance to Ukraine. Discussions encompassed commitments to air defence systems, ammunition supp

The EU Global Security Strategy (EUGS) introduced a new overall approach to the foreign and security policy of the EU. These changes may be interpreted as a corrigendum to the European Security Strategy (ESS). Where the ESS had proved to be over-optimistic, the EUGS was more conscious of the limits imposed by the EU’s own capabilities and by the intractability of other countries. It charted a course between isolationism and interventionism, which the EUGS now calls ‘principled pragmatism.’ This represented a return to realpolitik. As the EUGS put it, ‘responsible engagement can bring about positive change’. The EUGS defined the interests that are vital to all Member States: the security of EU citizens and territory, prosperity, democracy, and a rules-based global order to contain power politics. Based on these interests, the EUGS identified five priorities: (1) the security of the EU itself; (2) the neighbourhood; (3) how to deal with war and crisis; (4) stable regional orders across t

Although the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union) entered into force in 1993, the first European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted only in 2003. However, the absence of a formal security strategy did not necessarily mean the failure of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. The EU Member States used an implicit 'European way' of doing things in field of security and defence and was characterized by cooperation with partner countries, an emphasis on conflict prevention, and a broad approach to aid trade and diplomacy. The ESS steered the development of EU partnerships and long-term policies, such as development policy. However, it proved insufficient when the EU faced a full-fledged security crisis. It was the EU's failure to address the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s and again in Kosovo in 1999 that drove the institutional development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The ES